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Abstract 
Popular explanations of the Brexit vote have centred on the division between 
cosmopolitan internationalists who voted Remain, and geographically rooted 
individuals who voted Leave. In this paper, we conduct the first empirical test of 
whether residential immobility – the concept underpinning this distinction – was an 
important variable in the Brexit vote. We find that locally rooted individuals – defined 
as those living in their county of birth – were 7 percent more likely to support Leave. 
However, the impact of immobility was filtered by local circumstances: immobility only 
mattered for respondents in areas experiencing relative economic decline or increases 
in migrant populations. 
Keywords: Brexit; Globalisation; Mobility; Populism 
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1. Introduction  
On 23rd June 2016, the UK electorate voted to leave the European Union. There have 
been many attempts to explain the Brexit vote, but popular accounts have centred on 
an apparent division between two economically and culturally distinct groups: locally-
oriented, geographically-rooted individuals who voted to Leave, and mobile 
cosmopolitan internationalists who voted to Remain. This distinction echoes a larger 
academic debate about the tensions at the heart of populist politics (Inglehart and 
Norris, 2016); it is also linked to a long tradition of scholarship in sociology, including 
Merton’s (1957) work on local leaders in small-town America, and Tönnies’ (1940) 
classical distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. In the context of Brexit, 
David Goodhart (2016) offers a memorable expression of such ideas, labeling the 
localists as “Somewheres” and the cosmopolitans as “Anywheres”.  
The notion of mobility (or the lack thereof) lies at the heart of this distinction. Localist 
“Somewheres” are defined by being rooted in place, with strong attachments to the 
specifics of their local area and identities formed through local associations. By 
contrast, Anywheres are defined partly by their mobility. Such mobility, which typically 
occurs through attending a residential university and/or obtaining professional work 
some distance away from their place of birth, contributes to the development of what 
Goodhart (2016) describes as ‘portable “achieved identities”’ which are internationally- 
rather than locally-oriented. Beyond Brexit, mobility plays a similarly important, though 
largely implicit role in larger academic discussion of the connections between 
cosmopolitanism, localism, and the populist movements that have recently reshaped 
politics in the UK, US, and a considerable number of European countries.  
The division between mobile and immobile relates to two other common explanations 
for recent populist votes, both of which suggest that it was partly a reaction to 
globalisation (e.g. Becker et al., 2017). One common argument is that populism is a 
response to economic decline. Processes of economic globalisation will have 
benefited certain cities and regions, with residents and new migrants to these cities 
benefiting, but other places missing out (McCann, 2016). According to this argument, 
relative economic decline of themselves or their communities may have led to a 
populist backlash in the form of the Brexit vote. Supporting this view, Antonucci et al. 
(2017) find that individuals who perceived themselves to be losers from global 
economic integration were more likely to vote to leave the EU. A second common 
argument is that populism is a backlash against immigration. As previously 
homogenous communities diversified, some residents responded by voting for anti-
European parties and, eventually, Brexit (Carozzi, 2016; Becker & Fetzer, 2017). Both 
explanations – relative economic decline and migration – show populism as a 
response to globalisation by locally rooted residents who were in some sense ‘left 
behind’ by economic or demographic change.  
Yet despite the importance placed on mobility in discussion of the Brexit vote, research 
has not considered how residential mobility – or rather, immobility – influenced the 
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vote. People migrate for many reasons, but it may have multiple effects on those who 
do: changing fixed mentalities, opening up new social networks and ‘broadening the 
mind’ (Oishi, 2010). In contrast, immobility may be both a cause and a consequence 
of certain norms, beliefs and ways of thinking. The experience of living in one place 
over time will also shape mentalities. These influences may be changing in the UK 
which, while more mobile than many other European countries (Bell et al., 2015), has 
seen long term declines in rates of inter-regional migration (McCann, 2016; Clarke, 
2017). 
This paper uses the Brexit vote as an opportunity to derive and test hypotheses 
regarding these connections. Most generally, we consider the role that residential 
immobility plays in explaining voters’ choices in the 2016 EU Referendum. We argue 
that immobile voters are more likely to have built location-specific social and human 
capital, and consequently to hold a less pluralistic and more placebound identity. All 
else being equal, we therefore expect immobile individuals to be more likely to support 
Leave. However, recognising that there can be either negative or positive selection 
into immobility, the second hypothesis tested in this paper is that the effect of 
immobility on voting in the EU Referendum depends upon the extent to which one’s 
local community has been buffeted by globalisation and/or experienced considerable 
immigration. We identify two ideal types of placebound individuals, each associated 
with particular patterns of voting behaviour – those that choose to remain fixed in place 
because things are going well in their locale, and those that feel trapped. Those who 
select positively into immobility ought to be less likely to support Leave than those who 
select negatively.  
To test these ideas, we use early release data from Understanding Society, the 
primary longitudinal survey of UK households. In the most recent wave of the survey, 
individuals were asked the same question that was posed in the EU Referendum: 
"Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the 
European Union?" We use these data to investigate whether, holding constant other 
factors, respondents living in the same county in which they were born were more 
likely to support Brexit than respondents who have moved away, as well as whether 
the effects of immobility on support for Brexit depend on local change in economic 
performance or inward migration. Controlling for demographic characteristics, 
educational attainment, psychological values and cognitive ability, we find that those 
who were living in their county of birth in 2016 are around 7 percent more likely to state 
that the United Kingdom should leave the European Union. However, we also find that 
the effect of immobility on Brexit support is modified by recent local change in terms 
of wage growth and increases in the non-white British population: immobility only 
matters in places where wages are growing slowly or recent growth in the non-white 
British population exceeds 2 percentage points. 
This paper makes a number of contributions to the literature. Although there is a 
growing body of research into the determinants of voting patterns in the EU 
Referendum (for example Becker et al., 2017; Colantone and Stanig, 2016; Antonucci 
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et al, 2017), no study has yet explored the relationship between Brexit and residential 
immobility, nor the links between voting, mobility and local circumstances. To the best 
of our knowledge this avenue of study is also novel in within the larger literature on 
populist voting. And while academic research has long been preoccupied with the 
‘migrant’, this is not the majority experience in developed countries: our data shows 
that around 55% of UK residents live in their county of birth. Our results indicate that 
immobility, and in particular the combination of immobility and certain types of local 
change created an important set of circumstances which help explain the EU 
Referendum outcome. By improving our understanding of the complex interplay 
between individual characteristics, structural conditions and electoral outcomes, we 
therefore contribute to addressing the relative neglect in the social sciences of those 
who are ‘rooted in place’.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section two presents the literature on populism, 
the cosmopolitan/localist distinction, argues that investigating mobility is a crucial part 
of this, and develops a set of hypotheses. Section three presents the data and 
presents descriptive statistics on our key variables. Next, we describe the econometric 
model we use to test our hypotheses, before presenting basic regression results. 
Section five extends these results to investigate how individual mobility and local 
change are related. Section six concludes. 
 
2. Brexit, populism and immobility 
The Brexit vote is often described as an expression of populist sentiment (e.g. Wolf, 
2017). We can thus situate Brexit in relation to movements responsible for the electoral 
success of Donald Trump and the resurgence of far-right nationalist political parties in 
France, the Netherlands, Hungary and other European countries, as well as linking it 
to older populist manifestations. We can equally consider Brexit in light of more 
conceptual work on the subject of populism, a topic which has stimulated academic 
interest since the rise of the Populist Party in the US during the late 19 th century.  
And yet populism is a highly ambiguous umbrella. It is much a disputed term in 
academic circles, as well as a highly inclusive one that encompasses political and 
social movements inspired by both far-left and –right visions of society and 
governance; it is also a label that is almost never self-applied. Surveying these 
debates, Mudde and Kaltwasser (2012, p.8) identify a ‘minimal’ definition, under which 
society is conceptualised as being “ultimately separated into two homogenous and 
antagonistic groups, the ‘pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that 
politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.” 
This framing can be applied to movements with diverse political orientations. On the 
left it describes Hugo Chavez’s assertion of a fundamental conflict pitting Venezuela’s 
downtrodden against the austerity-imposing U.S. establishment and national elites. 
Meanwhile, during the Brexit debates and the 2017 French election, right-of-centre 
populists called for Britain and France to throw off the yoke of European regulation 
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and ‘unaccountable Brussels bureaucrats’ as keys to re-asserting ‘lost’ national 
greatness.  
In a recent study, Inglehart and Norris (2016) argue that populism as expressed in 
Brexit and the election of Donald Trump occupies a space orthogonal to left and right 
distinctions, lying instead at one end of a continuum whose opposing pole is 
cosmopolitanism, which “refers to the idea that all humans increasingly live and 
interact within a single global community, not simply within a single polity” (p.7). This 
distinction harkens back to Merton’s (1957) study of influential individuals in small-
town America, conducted during the second world war. Merton’s cosmopolitans 
distinguished themselves from ‘locals’ by the spatial extent of perceived community 
and social networks; by their weaker commitment to their present narrow geographical 
location. He also found that cosmopolitans relied on knowledge as a key to influence, 
while locals valued personal contact above all. 
Merton’s observations, and the larger distinction between cosmopolitanism and 
localism are germane in unpacking Brexit and other recent populist upswells. One way 
to understand recent populist movements is to view them as a rejection of a cultural 
and economic order that emerged after the end of Fordism, the oil crisis, and the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods international system, as well as out of the 
countercultural revolutions of the 1960s. This regime was marked by the widespread 
liberalization of rules governing trade and finance, the rise of dominant multinational 
firms, a twofold increase in the number of global migrants, as well as the introduction 
of new and highly disruptive technologies. These and other forces created a 
considerably less locally-bound world, in which the nation state lost the privileged 
position it held in the era of the Bretton Woods compromise in managing the economy, 
as well as its singular role in shaping defining identity and culture (Ong, 1999; Rodrik, 
2017).  
In cultural terms, populist movements assert their relevance as a response to a broken 
social compact between ‘the people’ and elites, as the latter have promulgated a vision 
of society marked by what Inglehart and Norris (2016, p. 3) call the “cultural escalator”, 
whereby values have become increasingly re-centred around a vision of an immigrant-
friendly multicultural society that embraces progressive movements aiming to expand 
environmental protection and promote various forms of human rights (women’s; 
LGBTQ, etc). This suggests cleavages between generations, as well as regularities in 
terms of individuals’ orientation towards political liberalism and immigration that were 
strongly articulated during the campaign for Brexit.  
Economics represents a second key explanation for the rising demand for populist 
politics. In high wage countries, a confluence of factors generated strong distributional 
effects that have conferred relative rewards in terms of employment prospects and 
pay upon workers with higher levels of skill and education. Put simply, the gaps 
between winners and losers have grown too large. The economic forces expanding 
these gaps may include shifting comparative advantage in high-wage countries and 
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consequent Stolper-Samuelson-type distributive effects (Autor et al., 2014; Kemeny 
et al., 2015); skill-bias in the direction of technological change (Autor et al., 2003); an 
insufficient supply of educated workers (Goldin and Katz, 2009); slowing productivity 
growth (Gordon, 2012); low-skill immigration (c.f. Peri and Yasenov, 2016; Borjas, 
2015; Nickell and Salaheen, 2015); the unequal effects and recovery from the Great 
Recession (Crescenzi et al, 2016); the public economics of austerity (Vasilopoulou et 
al, 2014); and, in certain countries at least, persistent unemployment (Blanchard and 
Summers, 1987). Populist movements have found fertile ground for arguments 
blaming globally-oriented cosmopolitan elites for their disregard for those in the 
national polity whose economic circumstances have been weakened by these trends. 
Moreover, as a consequence of the highly spatially-uneven nature of many of these 
distributional effects, contemporary populism is also ‘local’ in a specific geographical 
sense. In many countries, it pits highly-mobile cosmopolitan elites operating in 
networks of large, high-wage urbanised areas against less-well-educated workers 
inhabiting smaller, peripheral places. This is not to say that all high-skill workers have 
sorted into large agglomerations while lower-skill workers are uniformly found in 
smaller places; nor is it an assertion that all larger cities have done well over this 
period. Rather, it describes clear patterns of sorting of high-skill workers to high-wage, 
high-cost, and consequently high-amenity cities since 1980 (Diamond, 2016), which, 
in the US at least, also tend to offer additional rewards in the form of increased 
intergenerational mobility (Chetty et al, 2014), suggesting a growing gap between a 
small number of thriving urban locations and the rest of the economy. 
Put another way, a good number of peripheral economic locations continue to suffer 
what Gunnar Myrdal (1957) described as ‘backwash’ effects: being on the losing end 
of agglomeration economies, these places become progressively emptied of capital 
and skilled jobs. Individuals who remain are less likely to have the resources, ability 
or desire to move to locations offering greater opportunity. They are also more likely 
to be locally-oriented in terms of their investments in knowledge and social capital 
(Gordon, 2017). In short, in the 21st century, Merton’s locals and cosmopolitans are 
increasing (though not exclusively) found in different places. This sorting links cultural 
and economic factors, as locals and cosmopolitans are increasingly cut off from one 
another, reinforcing existing tendencies and limiting opportunities for mutual 
understanding. This account finds considerable anecdotal support, not least in the fact 
that support for Brexit, Trump, Marine le Pen and others tends to be strongest in less-
successful and/or smaller cities, and especially in non-urban areas.  
The migration flows described above have important implications for economic 
geography, but should not be overstated. Compared to the United States, inter-
regional migration flows in the UK are relatively small and declining (McCann, 2016; Clarke, 
2017). They are also highly selective, with certain groups – particularly university graduates – being 
most likely to move, and are often associated with other factors such as risk-taking 
behaviour. In the UK, declining inter-regional migration has been the response to 
several trends including reduced employment rate differentials (Clarke, 2017). But 
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migration is a cultural act, which is only partly determined by economic considerations: 
family and friends form a sort of location-specific human capital (Green, 2017; Gordon, 
2017). 
In his popular book on the Brexit vote, David Goodhart’s (2016) memorably, if 
controversially, captures these cleavages, distinguishing between ‘Anywheres’ and 
‘Somewheres’. Goodhart’s ‘Anywheres’ are educated elites whose identities are not 
strictly tied to any particular local community, or even Britain, and this group is seen 
to have dominated politics and culture for decades. These elites are said to have 
overwhelmingly voted to remain in the European Union. Meanwhile, ‘Somewheres’ – 
with strongly place-bound identities and associations – voted to leave the European 
Union, responding to both their local experience of recent uneven economic 
development and immigration, as well as the perception that elites in London are out 
of touch with their values. 
A growing number of scholarly studies are using data to understand the Brexit vote, 
and these tend to be framed by the broader debates around populism that we sketch 
above. The most rigorous use individual-level data to identify the relationship between 
voting patterns and individual demographic and psychographic features. Results thus 
far support the full range of populist narratives, though specific emphases differ. For 
instance, using pre-referendum British Election Survey (BES) data that recorded 
individuals’ voting intention, Hobolt (2016) finds evidence consistent with both cultural 
and economic themes. Older, less-educated, and lower-income respondents were 
more likely to intend to vote for Brexit, as were those who expressed more concern 
about immigration and multiculturalism. Using the same dataset, Antonucci et al., 
(2017) find a nonlinear relationship between voting Leave and both education and 
income, with voters with moderate levels of income and education being more likely 
to vote for Brexit than those with very low or higher levels. Also using BES, Colantone 
and Stanig (2016) find a robust positive relationship between regional vulnerability to 
import competition and the intention to vote for Brexit, a finding that fits with recent 
evidence linking populism to trade exposure in the United States (Autor et al, 2016). 
One might go some way towards reconciling these two papers’ findings with reference 
to work on job polarisation that confirms this ‘hollowing out’ effect in various economies 
(Goos et al. 2009).  
A range of studies examine the role played by international migration in the EU 
referendum. Colantone and Stanig (2016) conclude that stocks and flows of 
immigrants in NUTS 3 regions are unrelated to voting intention, a finding that stands 
in direct contrast to that found by Goodwin and Milazzo (2017), who use more 
disaggregated parliamentary constituencies. Using the Essex Continuous Monitoring 
Survey, Clarke et al (2017) show that individual perceptions played an important role 
in shaping voting patterns. Specifically, individuals’ perceptual tradeoffs between 
immigration and terrorism, and between the economy and global influence were 
important in shaping voting patterns, as were assessments of individual political 
leaders in the Leave and Remain campaigns. Using data from the European Social 
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Survey, Gordon (2017) also uncovers an important role for individual attitudes, in 
particular those towards immigrants, as well as one’s educational and occupational 
background. 
Empirical work on Brexit remains at an early stage, and many important questions 
remain unanswered. The focus of this paper is on one such unanswered question. 
To our knowledge, studies of Brexit and of populism more generally have not yet 
sought to understand how mobility – or the lack thereof – may play a role in shaping 
populist politics. This is true despite the fact that differences between mobile and 
immobile populations lie at the centre of theories of social division, linking both 
economic and cultural drivers of populism; these differences loom especially large in 
the formulation of the cosmopolitan-localist dichotomy. Indeed, cosmopolitans can 
only be cosmopolitan because they have reached beyond their local circumstances. 
In the internet age (and even before), a cosmopolitan identity might in principle be 
constructed through purely sedentary means, in practice there is every reason to 
think that, for many, actual residential mobility is involved, and that it strengthens this 
orientation. 
It is easy to think of reasons why the experience of moving might shift political views 
towards a more cosmopolitan perspective: loosely, it facilitates exposure to new ideas 
and peoples, puts previous experiences in their wider context, and breaks up familiar 
references points. Mobility ought to independently influence Brexit support for a few 
reasons. While individuals who are immobile are more likely to have highly localised 
social networks, the networks of movers span more than one location (Oishi, 2010). 
As a consequence, we expect that stayers will have more strongly place-based 
identities. Movers are also more likely to travel back and forth between these locations, 
in the process passing through other places that provide a relative wider sense of the 
country as a whole. And through these networks and interactions across locations, 
movers are more likely to have had more encounters with different types of people 
(Gordon, 2017). Such experiences increase the likelihood of being exposed to 
different ideas. In some ways, the rationale for a mobility effect reflect a particular 
articulation of the idiom, ‘travel broadens the mind,’ in which by ‘travel’ we mean having 
lived in more than one location. 
This suggests that residentially immobility individuals are more likely to support leaving 
the European Union. Nonetheless, it is hard to develop a causal story from mobility to 
voting, as mobility is both a cause and a consequence of a host of individual 
characteristics and political views. Ambition, a tolerance for risk, open-mindedness 
and other individual features both cause people to move from place to place, but may 
also be reinforced by the act of moving (Jokela, 2009; Zimmerman and Neyer, 2013). 
Moreover, since Greenwood (1997) identifies participation in higher education and 
obtaining employment as two of the most important drivers of internal migration in 
developed economies, it is plausible that mobility may both enable an improvement in 
human capital, and simultaneously afford entry into social networks and economic 
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opportunities that mean individuals are better positioned to succeed in the global 
economy. This presents a major confounding problem in identifying the causal effects 
of (im)mobility, one which we can only address partially by including a wide range of 
potential confounders as covariates.  
Mobility or internal migration is driven by a complex mix of individual features and 
locational differences (ibid), with residential movers in the UK changing locations for 
diverse reasons at a range of different points in their life-cycle (ONS, 2016). On the 
other hand, we conjecture two ideal types of immobile people: those that select into 
immobility because the contemporary lived social and economic features in the 
counties in which they are born are not dissatisfying; and those that are ‘stuck’ in 
circumstances that are not satisfying but for whatever reason they are unable or 
unwilling to move to resolve them. Though locational satisfaction is likely to be driven 
by individual, idiosyncratic preferences, the review above suggests that locally specific 
experiences of globalisation and community are likely to act as conditioning forces. 
This bifurcation suggests the following hypothesis: the effect of immobility on support 
for Brexit will depend on the local extent of local economic or demographic change.  
 
3. Data  
Data is drawn from Understanding Society (also known as the UK Household 
Longitudinal Study), a household panel survey that has followed individuals from 
approximately 40,000 households in the United Kingdom since 2009. Where possible, 
all adult (age 16 or above) members of Understanding Society households are 
interviewed each year; original sample members are followed if they leave their 
original household and new (or newly eligible) members of Understanding Society 
households are also added to the survey. Since Wave 2 (2010), Understanding 
Society has incorporated continuing participants of the British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS), a similar household panel survey of around 8,000 households in the 
UK which began in 1991 and ran for 18 successive years. In Wave 8, Understanding 
Society respondents were asked the same question that was posed in the UK 
referendum on EU membership that took place on 23rd June 2016: ‘Should the United 
Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?’ The 
answer to this question is our dependent variable.1 
Owing to the central focus on immobility and Brexit voting preferences, the main 
independent variable employed in this analysis is whether a respondent was living in 
the same county in which they were born at the most recent interview. We set out 
more on how we construct this variable in Appendix A. The binary variable was 
generated by comparing the county in which respondents were born with the county 
in which they were living in at Wave 8 or, where data was missing, at Wave 7. Our 
                                                                 
1 We exclude missing responses. Note that our data is the early-access version of the Understanding Society, made available by 
the Institute of Social and Economic Research at the University of Essex ahead of the scheduled full release of Wave 8 data in 
November 2018. 
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main variable of interest, immobile, is 1 where a respondent is living in the county they 
were born in and 0 when not2. A small majority (55%) of our sample live in their county 
of birth. As we report below, we additionally consider several alternative measures of 
immobility. 
Table 1. Brexit support (%) by mobility 
 Mobility:   
Should the United Kingdom 
remain a member of the 
European Union? 
Mobile (lives outside 
county of birth) 
Immobile (lives in 
county of birth) 
Total 
Yes 60.0 48.8 53.6 
No 40.0 51.2 46.4 
Note: N = 6,221. Weights applied. 
The bivariate relationship between Brexit support and immobility is given in table 1. 
For simplicity, we restrict the table to the smallest sample used in our results (that 
used in table 4), although this affects the results little, and use weights so the results 
are representative of the UK population. The results show a slight over-statement of 
support for remaining in the EU: 53 percent support Remain, compared to 48 percent 
in the actual EU Referendum. They also show a significant difference in Brexit support 
between the immobile and the mobile. More than half (51 percent) of the immobile 
support Leave, compared to just 41 percent of the mobile.  
 
4. Research Design  
4.1  Model and methodology 
Our data is a cross-section, where the dependent variable takes the form of the  
question posed in the EU referendum. To separate out the impact of immobility from 
other potentially confounding factors, we begin by estimating a simple probit 
regression model. This is estimated for each individual ‘i’ and takes the following form:  
 EU Refi = ɑ + β1 Immobilei + β'2 Personi + β'3 Placei + β4 Immobility*Placei + ε  
Where, “Immobile” is an indicator for whether the individual lives in their county of 
birth. “Person” is a vector of individual characteristics such as age, age2, education, 
gender, ethnicity, personality and political engagement. “Place” is a vector of local 
characteristics, of which the two most important are indicators of economic and cultural 
change. Most importantly here, “Immobility*Place” is the linear interaction term 
                                                                 
2 It is not possible to identify the age at w hich those w ho are not living in the same county in w hich they w ere born moved from 
the Understanding Society data. The 0 (mover) category thus includes respondents who moved as children and respondents 
w ho moved as adults, the common denominator being they have lived in more than one county and been exposed to more than 
one local context since birth, in contrast to immobile respondents.  
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between individual mobility and our two measures of local change drawn from UK 
Nomis. 
Control variables 
To motivate our control variables, we draw on the literature on the determinants of 
populist voting (see Inglehart and Norris, 2016, or Antonnuci et al., 2017). First, we 
include a set of variables for the basic demographic characteristics of individuals. 
Males were generally seen as more likely to support Brexit, so we include a control for 
gender. Age was also significant, with older voters generally being more likely to 
support Leave up to a certain point, beyond which older voters were more likely to 
support Remain. We control both for age and, owing to the differential effect with 
increasing age, also use a quadratic term. We also include an ethnicity variable to 
reflect the fact that whites have tended to be more Eurosceptic than members of ethnic 
minorities. Data on income in the early release data have a large number of missing 
observations, so instead we include controls for both income satisfaction and life 
satisfaction. 
Educational attainment is seen as a critical determinant of populist views, with those 
holding lower educational qualifications being more likely to be pro-Brexit. In the 
present context, education is doubly crucial, since those with higher qualifications are 
also more likely to be mobile, owing in part to the residential model of higher education 
in the United Kingdom. We therefore include controls for four major educational 
categories: below GCSE level; GCSE or equivalent; A-Level or equivalent; and 
undergraduate degree or higher. To account for the fact that Understanding Society 
Wave 8 fieldwork spanned the EU referendum vote and that public knowledge of the 
outcome may have altered responses to the EU membership question posed in Wave 
8, we incorporate a binary variable which denotes whether the respondent was 
interviewed before or after 23rd June 2016. Summary statistics and definitions for these 
variables are included in table 2.  
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Table 2. Variable definitions and summary statistics  
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
UK should leave the 
European Union 
Answers yes to: “Should the United 
Kingdom remain a member of the 
European Union? 
 0.46   0.50  0 1 
Lives in county of birth 
Lives in county in which they were born 
 0.56   0.50  0 1 
Local best friend 
All named best friends live less than 5 
miles away  0.28   0.45  0 1 
Local mother Mother lives < 30 minutes away  0.28   0.45  0 1 
Stayer-returner 
Has lived outside county in lifetime of 
survey, but now in county of birth  0.04   0.20  0 1 
Verbal ability 
Verbal fluency: Count of correct answers 
(from 49)   23.15   6.32  0 49 
Numeric ability 
Numeric ability: Count of items answered 
correctly (from 5)  3.77   1.04  0 5 
Agreeableness 
 Big 5 Personality trait: Agreeableness  
 5.60   1.02  1 7 
Conscientiousness 
Big 5 Personality trait: 
Conscientiousness  5.45   1.08  1 7 
Extraversion  Big 5 Personality trait: Extraversion  4.61   1.28  1 7 
Neuroticism Big 5 Personality trait: Neuroticism  3.60   1.41  1 7 
Openness Big 5 Personality trait: Openness   4.63   1.27  1 7 
Traditional 
Believes the husband should earn, wife 
should stay at home  0.38   0.48  0 1 
Government 
don't have a say in what government 
does  1.20   0.86  0 2 
Environmental scepticism 
environmental crisis has been 
exaggerated  1.03   0.79  0 2 
officials public officials don't care  1.27   0.80  0 2 
Male Male gender  0.48   0.50  0 1 
White White ethnicity 0.96 0.19 0 1 
Mixed Mixed ethnicity  0.01   0.09  0 1 
Asian Asian ethnicity  0.02   0.13  0 1 
Black Black ethnicity  0.00   0.07  0 1 
Other “Other” ethnicity  0.00   0.04  0 1 
Age Age   50.25   17.27  20 100 
Age Squared Age squared  2,821   1,808  400 10000 
Sampled before 
referendum 
Sampling occurred before the 
referendum vote (23rd June 2016)  0.42   0.49  0 1 
Employed  Employed at time of 2016 interview 0.62 0.49 0 1 
Unemployed Unemployed at time of 2016 interview  0.03   0.17  0 1 
Inactive Inactive at time of 2016 interview  0.06   0.24  0 1 
Retired Retired at time of 2016 interview  0.26   0.44  0 1 
Student Student at time of 2016 interview  0.01   0.12  0 1 
No qualifications Highest qualification: No qualification 0.27 0.44   
GCSE  Highest qualification: GCSE or equivalent  0.27   0.44  0 1 
A Level Highest qualification: A-level  0.11   0.32  0 1 
Degree 
Highest qualification: Degree or 
equivalent  0.37   0.48  0 1 
Income satisfaction Self-reported satisfaction with income  4.92   1.57  1 7 
Life satisfaction Self-reported satisfaction with life  5.27   1.41  1 7 
Note: 6,221 Observations. Source for all reported variables is Understanding Society, various waves. 
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4.2  Basic results 
Table 3 summarises the results of our basic regression model. This shows that 
people living in their county of birth are more likely to be pro-Brexit and that this 
relationship holds when we control for basic personal characteristics (age, ethnicity) 
and broader personal characteristics (education, labour force status and both income 
and life satisfaction). Figure 1 considers the average marginal effects. This shows 
that, on average, the immobile were 10 percent more likely to have pro-Brexit beliefs, 
after controlling for basic individual characteristics. While this is not the most 
important variable in our model (the average marginal effect for having a degree is a 
20% decrease in probabilities), it is relatively robust across specifications and 
consistently statistically significant.  
 
Table 3. Impact of immobility on Brexit support, probit regression results  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Dependent variable:  
Believes UK should leave the European Union 
Lives in county of birth 0.279*** 0.236*** 0.324*** 
 (0.0367) (0.0387) (0.0536) 
Sample Full Full Only those who 
voted in 2016 
Controls No Yes Yes 
Observations 6,221 6,221 3,457 
Note: Estimated as probit regression results with robust standard errors. Weights applied. Controls used in 
columns 2 and 3: Gender, 5 Ethnic Categories, Age, Age2, whether sampled before Brexit, labour force status 
(employed, retired, student, unemployed, inactive), education, life satisfaction, income satisfaction and 
Government Office Region. Note that regression coefficients without restricting sample to those used in all 
regressions are very similar: for column 1, beta=0.231026, (n = 10,014), for column 3, beta = 0.2284 (n = 7,290)  
 
Our control variables also provide some insights into the demographics of the Brexit 
vote. Ethnically white people were more likely to favour Brexit, as were older people 
although the effect declines. Most likely reflecting a combination of increasingly close 
polls in the run-up to the vote and sample response bias, those sampled before the 
vote were less likely to be pro-Brexit than those afterwards. In addition, those with 
higher income satisfaction were less likely to be pro-Brexit; those with higher life 
satisfaction more likely. Education was a strong predictor of Brexit support. That the 
immobility effect holds when controlling for educational attainment is particularly 
noteworthy given the established association between higher educational attainment 
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and mobility in the United Kingdom (Green, 2017). The implication of table 3 is that 
among respondents with the same levels of educational attainment (for example those 
with no or low qualifications), those who were living in their county of birth were more 
likely to be pro-Brexit than those who have moved at some point in their life. In other 
words, immobility appears to shape voting preferences over and above the effect of 
educational attainment.  
 
Figure 1. Average marginal effects (with 95% confidence intervals) of impact of 
living in county of birth on Brexit beliefs 
 
Note: Each model presents the average marginal effect of the impact of immobility (defined as living in county of 
birth) on belief that Britain should leave the European Union. Models specified as in table 3, with controls for 
Gender, 5 Ethnic Categories, Age, Age2, whether sampled before Brexit, labour force status (employed, retired, 
student, unemployed, inactive), education, life satisfaction, income satisfaction and Government Office Region. 
 
4.3 Testing other explanations: Psychology, values, social networks and 
mobility 
There are several obvious channels through which immobility might be associated with 
populist voting. Other literature has suggested that factors such as individual values 
or personal psychology may influence voting intentions (see Kaufman, 2016, for 
example). These will be highly inter-related with mobility with causality running both 
ways. For example, more psychologically open individuals might be more likely to 
move; but movement will make individuals more psychologically open. In table 4 we 
incorporate a series of potentially confounding variables into our model, taken from 
earlier waves of Understanding Society, to test whether these affect the impact of 
immobility on pro-Brexit beliefs. While we cannot be perfectly confident in arguing that 
results indicate an independent causal role for immobility in shaping Brexit support, 
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controlling for these factors helps isolate the distinct effect of mobility, independent of 
its impact on these.3 
 
Table 4. Immobility and Brexit support – alternative explanations, 2016 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Area Variable 
 
Dependent variable:  
Believes UK should leave the European Union  
 
           
Immobility Lives in county of birth 0.244*** 0.260*** 0.216*** 0.207*** 
  (0.0408) (0.0407) (0.0411) (0.0417) 
Cognitive test Verbal ability -0.00830**   -0.00437 
  (0.00324)   (0.00333) 
 Numeric ability -0.0928***   -0.0701*** 
  (0.0220)   (0.0228) 
Psychology 
Agreeableness  -0.0823***  -0.0679*** 
   (0.0205)  (0.0210) 
 Conscientiousness  0.0521***  0.0437** 
   (0.0199)  (0.0205) 
 Extraversion  0.0329**  0.0222 
   (0.0155)  (0.0158) 
 Neuroticism  -0.0126  -0.0123 
   (0.0147)  (0.0152) 
 Openness  -0.0837***  -0.0573*** 
   (0.0159)  (0.0165) 
Values / beliefs  Husband should earn, wife 
should stay at home   0.164*** 0.152*** 
    (0.0405) (0.0407) 
 Don't have a say in what 
government does   0.140*** 0.127*** 
    (0.0282) (0.0286) 
 Environmental crisis has been 
exaggerated   0.264*** 0.251*** 
    (0.0252) (0.0254) 
 Public officials don't care   0.144*** 0.137*** 
    (0.0304) (0.0305) 
 Constant -0.299 -0.0829 -1.625*** -0.952*** 
  (0.244) (0.286) (0.245) (0.312) 
 Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Observations 6,221 6,221 6,221 6,221 
 Pseudo R2 0.0881 0.0912 0.123 0.130 
Estimated as a probit regression with robust standard errors. Unreported controls are for gender, age, age 2, 
ethnicity, if interviewed before Referendum, education, labour force status and region. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Marginal effect for “Lives in county of birth” is 0.07 in column 4. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
A first concern is that there may be some unobserved factor related to cognitive ability 
which survives even once we include educational controls (for example, some 
                                                                 
3 We do attempt to show  a causal effect using an instrumental variable (IV) approach based on birth order, follow ing the intuition 
that f irst born children are likely to move further from home. Unfortunately, w hile our results suggest a positive relationship 
betw een immobility and Brexit, the instrument is w eak.  
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significant difference between GCSE grades or the quality of degree level 
qualifications). We address this by introducing two indicators for cognitive testing 
taken from an earlier wave of the data: one of which controls for numeric ability and 
another for verbal recollection. These are a scale where a higher positive value 
indicates a higher number of correct answers in a cognitive test (note the two variables 
have different scales). These are introduced in model 1, but including these variables 
does not seem to influence the basic result, and our variable for immobility remains 
statistically significant with a similar coefficient.  
Psychological factors are a second potential explanation. These have been seen as 
important in explaining populist votes such as Brexit (Obschonka et al., 2017; 
Garretsen et al., 2017). Moreover, migration decisions are partly explained by 
individual psychology (Rentfrow et al., 2008). To account for this, we use indicators of 
the established “Big Five” indicators of personality traits (see Barrick and Mount, 
1991). These are: Conscientiousness – associated with hard work, organisation and 
task completion; Extraversion – being outgoing, sociable and assertive; Openness – 
capturing originality, creativity and open to new ideas; Agreeableness – which 
captures kindness and trust, and; Neuroticism – if the individual is worried and tense.  
Each of these is a scale between 1 – 7, with a set of sub-questions are used to 
establish an overall indicator. These are introduced in model 2. They show that 
psychological factors did matter for Brexit beliefs - Conscientiousness and 
Extraversion are positively related to being pro-Brexit, while Openness and 
Agreeableness are negatively so. These individual level findings are very similar to 
the local authority level study of Garretsen et al. (2017). However, our coefficient for 
immobility changes little even once we control for psychology. 
Finally, the argument has been made repeatedly that values mattered in the Brexit 
vote. For example, Kaufmann (2016) argues that differences in values were the main 
dividing line between remain and leave voters. To rule this out, model 3 includes four 
indicators which reflect individual values or belief. These are the extent to which 
people believe four statements related to gender differences in the home, their power 
to influence government, scepticism about climate change and the intentions of public 
officials. While they show clear evidence that values matter, with all four beliefs 
positively and statistically significantly related to pro-Brexit views, immobility seems to 
matter even with these controls. 
Finally, in model 4 we include variables for psychology, cognitive ability, beliefs / 
values together. The headline remains similar: regardless of controls used, the 
variable for immobility is positive and statistically significant. To quantify this effect, we 
compute the average marginal effect. This shows that even when controlling for many 
of the potential mechanisms through which living in county of birth might influence 
support for Brexit, it is still associated with a 7 percent higher probability of support for 
Brexit. 
5. Local circumstances, mobility and Brexit 
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Our second research question is the extent to which local change – either in terms of 
increased migration or relative economic decline – was felt differently by the 
immobile and shaped their voting preferences. As Gordon (2017) argues, recent 
populist votes can be understood partly as geographical phenomenon, in two 
senses. Firstly, because of concentrations of individuals in certain places which have 
led to the ‘map’ of populist votes. But secondly, because certain areas have 
experienced change and this may have presented certain groups with a loss of 
ability to control their local environment. Two explanations – the cultural view of 
populist votes as a response to changing communities, and the economic view of 
populism as a threat to the economic positions of many in declining areas – are 
linked at a local level. The immobile are, by definition, more tied to their local area 
and thus more exposed to external change, so local change may have influenced 
them more than other groups, with the Brexit vote being a way of protesting against 
changes to their local environment.  
 
 
Table 5. Probit regressions between local change interacted with mobility and 
Brexit support 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
 
Dependent variable:  
Believes UK should leave the European Union  
 
          
Log local gross weekly full time pay, 2015 0.315*** 0.320***   
 (0.0661) (0.0660)   
Immobile: Lives in county of birth 0.199*** 0.387*** 0.175*** 0.0514 
 (0.0415) (0.0939) (0.0411) (0.0713) 
Percent Δ in gross weekly full time pay, 2008 – 2015 -0.00951** -0.00281   
 (0.00373) (0.00475)   
Immobile * Percent Δ in local gross weekly full time pay, 2008 
- 2015  -0.0137**   
  (0.00596)   
Percent Not White British   -0.000399 -0.000496 
   (0.00321) (0.00323) 
Percentage Point Δ Not White-British, 2005 - 2015   0.0194* 0.00557 
   (0.0111) (0.0130) 
Immobile * Percentage Point Δ Not White-British, 2005 - 2015    0.0237** 
    (0.0120) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,684 5,684 5,684 5,684 
Estimated as probit regressions with robust standard errors. Excludes Northern Ireland. Unreported controls are 
for gender, age, age2, ethnicity, if interviewed before Referendum, education and labour force status.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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To test these ideas, in table 5 we interact the immobility variable with two indicators 
of recent local change drawn from UK Nomis: percentage growth in average gross 
weekly wages between 2008 and 2015 and percentage point change in the share of 
non-white British people in the local area, 2005 - 2015. We adapt the model used in 
table 4, column 5 slightly. Because subsequent change is likely to be affected by 
initial levels, we now include variables for either the average wage of the county of 
residence or the initial proportion of non-white British residents. We also exclude the 
regional dummies, as these are highly collinear with the other local indicators, and 
residents of Northern Ireland are excluded as no sub-national data is available there.   
 
Figure 2. Impact of immobility on Brexit beliefs at different levels of economic 
change, predictive marginal effect 
 
Note: Each model presents the predicted marginal effect of the impact of immobility (defined as living in county of 
birth) at different levels of local changes in wages on belief that Britain should leave the European Union. 95% 
Confidence intervals given by shaded area. Models specified as in table 5, with controls for Gender, 5 Ethnic 
Categories, Age, Age2, whether sampled before Brexit, labour force status (employed, retired, student, 
unemployed, inactive), education, life satisfaction, income satisfaction, cognitive testing, the Big 5 personality 
traits and values. 
 
Models 1 and 2 show the results for changing pay levels; models 3 and 4 for changing 
demographics. We do not include both sets of variables together because of 
collinearity. We note that, perhaps surprisingly, places with a higher average income 
tended to see more people support Brexit, although the effect is small and note that 
we control for individual satisfaction with their own income. More to the point, change 
in pay also matters, with percentage change in gross weekly full time pay between 
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2008 and 2015 negatively related to Brexit support. People in places experiencing 
relative economic decline were more likely to support Brexit and vice versa. Model 2 
shows an important caveat to this result: local pay change only matters amongst those 
who are immobile. We develop this line of analysis in figure 2, which graphically 
presents the impact of immobility on probability of being pro-Brexit at different levels 
of local pay. The central line gives the predicted marginal effect, with the shaded area 
illustrating the 95% confidence intervals. This shows that the effect of immobility on 
pro-Brexit views is higher when local pay increases have been lower. But where the 
local economy has been performing better the impact of immobility declines and below 
a certain point is not significantly different from zero.  
 
 
Figure 3. Impact of immobility on Brexit beliefs at different levels of 
demographic change, predictive marginal effect 
 
Note: Each model presents the predicted marginal effect of the impact of immobility (defined as living in county of 
birth) at different levels of local changes in non-White population on belief that Britain should leave the European 
Union. 95% Confidence intervals given by shaded area. Models specified as in table 5, with controls for Gender, 
5 Ethnic Categories, Age, Age2, whether sampled before Brexit, labour force status (employed, retired, student, 
unemployed, inactive), education, life satisfaction, income satisfaction, cognitive testing, the Big 5 personality 
traits and values. 
 
Models 3 and 4 in Table 5 consider changes in demographic composition. Our 
indicator here - the proportion who do not consider themselves white British - is 
intended to capture both inward migration and ethnic change. We note first of all that 
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the proportion who are not white British in a local area is unrelated to support for Brexit. 
Change in the share of the population who are not white-British may matter, but the 
effect is only statistically significant at the 1% level. However, once this is interacted 
with immobility the effect becomes clearer. As with the results for changes in local 
wages, it is the combination of both immobility and either economic or demographic 
change which seems to matter. We illustrate this graphically in figure 3. This shows 
an almost opposite effect than for wages: the effect of immobility on Brexit increases 
as local non-white British share increase. The differences between the voting 
preferences of the mobile and immobile are, in contrast, negligible where there has 
been little local change. 
 
 
Sensitivity Checks 
One concern with our results is that our indicator of immobility may not fully capture 
the underlying concept of interest. As discussed above, we define immobile 
respondents as those who were living in the same county in which they were born in 
2016; and mobile respondents as those who were not. This indicator has a number of 
merits, as it is directly about the individual’s experience and can be consistently 
applied across time. There are two potential limitations to this definition. First, we 
cannot conclusively establish from the data that immobile respondents have always 
lived in their county of birth. However, we can check whether immobile respondents 
have ever lived elsewhere during the period in which they have participated in 
Understanding Society, or its predecessor, the British Household Panel Survey. To 
test if this influences our results, we generate a dummy variable which identifies 
immobile respondents who left and then returned. Table 6 gives the results of models 
using this variable, both without (model 1) and with (model 2) our core indicator of 
immobility. It makes little difference to the results, suggesting that our main results are 
driven by longer-term processes of immobility rather than short-term moves.  
 
As a further robustness test, we also identify alternative measures of immobility in our 
data. The first is derived from a question which asks each individual about the location 
of up to 3 best friends. Our variable is 1 if all named best friends live within 5 miles of 
the respondent, and 0 otherwise. We assume that immobile individuals will have made 
friends locally, and through homophily their friends will also be less likely to move 
away. A second, related variable is the distance from the respondent’s mother: this is 
1 if the respondents mother lives within 15 minutes journey time, and 0 otherwise. This 
is only available for a smaller group of respondents and those whose mother is still 
alive. But we assume that locally rooted people live close to their parents, and so this 
variable should be a good alternative indicator (although it cannot account for materna l 
moves). In models 3 and 4 of Table 6, we include measures of the proximity of one’s 
best friends, and one’s mother, respectively, in each case without our primary 
immobility indicator. On their own, both these alternative measures are positively and 
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significantly related to support for Brexit. Yet when included alongside our county of 
birth indicator neither is statistically significant. We take this as evidence that 
immobility does matter, even if defined in other ways, but also that we have identified 
the best variable to capture it.  
 
6. Conclusions  
The UK electorate voted to leave the European Union on 23rd June 2016. This vote 
was one of a series of populist votes which have been seen as a reaction to the 
divergent fortunes of people and places under processes of globalisation. Implicit 
within this ‘divergent fortunes’ narrative is a division between mobile and the immobile 
citizens: mobility has long been seen as important by sociologists, political scientists 
and geographers but no research has hitherto explored whether residential immobility 
was an important variable in the Brexit vote. This paper addresses this gap using early 
access data from Understanding Society, and also explores whether the effects of 
immobility on support for Brexit are contingent on local change in economic 
performance or inward migration.  
Our results show a consistent effect: immobile people – proxied as those living in their 
county of birth – are around 7% more likely to be in favour of Brexit, even when 
controlling for individual, cultural, or psychological factors which might be associated 
with immobility. However, our results are only partly about immobility per se. Instead, 
our analysis suggests that the effect of immobility on individual support for Brexit is 
filtered by local circumstances: immobility only matters for respondents living in places 
experiencing relative economic decline or those where there have been substantial 
recent increases in non-white British migration. Had more of the British electorate 
moved away from the place they were born in; had the places in which the immobile 
have stayed in fared better economically under processes of globalisation; or had 
these places remained more stable in terms of demographic composition, then the EU 
Referendum outcome may have been different.  
The policy implications of our results are nuanced. The obvious implication of our work 
is that declining rates of geographical mobility may have helped explain the Brexit 
vote. It is clear that many groups in the UK are currently unable to move, as they are 
“shut out” of some of the most important areas of opportunity by high house prices 
(Luce 2017:14). Given widening geographical divergence in the UK (McCann, 2016), 
facilitating access to growing cities and regions for those who want to move is one 
potential policy implication. Yet spatial mobility cannot be the whole solution: many 
people do not want to move, and an economic development policy which relies solely 
on spatial mobility into advantaged areas ignores the benefits of stable community, 
people’s social networks and attachment to place. Indeed, our second finding – that 
people living in areas experiencing relative economic decline or demographic change 
– were more likely to support Brexit, hints at the need to spread opportunity more 
widely across the UK. There are a number of suggested ways of doing this. For 
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example, Iammarino et al (2017) argue for the use of place-sensitive development 
policies, while Martin et al. (2016) argue for radical decentralisation of power. Whether 
either of these proposals are sufficient,  in addition to supporting individuals in moving 
to areas of opportunity, efforts need to be made to ensure the opportunities are spread 
more widely. 
 
It is important also to caveat our results: immobility was just one factor in the vote, 
others, such as educational attainment, were more important, and we are unable to 
fully tease out the complex linkages between mobility, individual psychology and 
values and populist voting. But we believe our work highlights two fruitful areas of 
future research. Firstly, while we have begun to investigate the relationships between 
mobility, values and populism, more work in this area would help better understand 
recent reactions to globalisation. Secondly, we argue for a renewed focus on those 
who are immobile. The literature on economic geography has (including the authors’  
own work), perhaps been skewed to study of those who are mobile. This ignores the 
majority of the population and their circumstances. The current backlash against 
globalisation, in the form of Brexit and the Trump vote, justifies an even greater focus 
on the local.   
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Figure 1. Average marginal effects (with 95% confidence intervals) of impact of 
living in county of birth on Brexit beliefs 
 
Note: Each model presents the average marginal effect of the impact of immobility (defined as living in county of 
birth) on belief that Britain should leave the European Union. Models specified as in table 3, with controls for 
Gender, 5 Ethnic Categories, Age, Age2, whether sampled before Brexit, labour force status (employed, retired, 
student, unemployed, inactive), education, life satisfaction, income satisfaction and Government Office Region. 
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Figure 2. Impact of immobility on Brexit beliefs at different levels of economic 
change, predictive marginal effect 
Note: Each model presents the predicted marginal effect of the impact of immobility (defined as living in county of 
birth) at different levels of local changes in wages on belief that Britain should leave the European Union. 95% 
Confidence intervals given by shaded area. Models specified as in table 5, with controls for Gender, 5 Ethnic 
Categories, Age, Age2, whether sampled before Brexit, labour force status (employed, retired, student, 
unemployed, inactive), education, life satisfaction, income satisfaction, cognitive testing, the Big 5 personality 
traits and values. 
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Figure 3. Impact of immobility on Brexit beliefs at different levels of 
demographic change, predictive marginal effect 
 
Note: Each model presents the predicted marginal effect of the impact of immobility (defined as living in county of 
birth) at different levels of local changes in non-White population on belief that Britain should leave the European 
Union. 95% Confidence intervals given by shaded area. Models specified as in table 5, with controls for Gender, 
5 Ethnic Categories, Age, Age2, whether sampled before Brexit, labour force status (employed, retired, student, 
unemployed, inactive), education, life satisfaction, income satisfaction, cognitive testing, the Big 5 personality 
traits and values. 
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Table 1. Brexit support (%) by mobility 
 Mobility:   
Should the United Kingdom 
remain a member of the 
European Union? 
Mobile (lives outside 
county of birth) 
Immobile (lives in 
county of birth) 
Total 
Yes 60.0 48.8 53.6 
No 40.0 51.2 46.4 
Note: N = 6,221. Weights applied. 
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Table 2. Variable definitions and summary statistics  
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
UK should leave the 
European Union 
Answers yes to: “Should the United 
Kingdom remain a member of the 
European Union? 
 0.46   0.50  0 1 
Lives in county of birth 
Lives in county in which they were born 
 0.56   0.50  0 1 
Local best friend 
All named best friends live less than 5 
miles away  0.28   0.45  0 1 
Local mother Mother lives < 30 minutes away  0.28   0.45  0 1 
Stayer-returner 
Has lived outside county in lifetime of 
survey, but now in county of birth  0.04   0.20  0 1 
Verbal ability 
Verbal fluency: Count of correct answers 
(from 49)   23.15   6.32  0 49 
Numeric ability 
Numeric ability: Count of items answered 
correctly (from 5)  3.77   1.04  0 5 
Agreeableness 
 Big 5 Personality trait: Agreeableness  
 5.60   1.02  1 7 
Conscientiousness 
Big 5 Personality trait: 
Conscientiousness  5.45   1.08  1 7 
Extraversion  Big 5 Personality trait: Extraversion  4.61   1.28  1 7 
Neuroticism Big 5 Personality trait: Neuroticism  3.60   1.41  1 7 
Openness Big 5 Personality trait: Openness   4.63   1.27  1 7 
Traditional 
Believes the husband should earn, wife 
should stay at home  0.38   0.48  0 1 
Government 
don't have a say in what government 
does  1.20   0.86  0 2 
Environmental scepticism 
environmental crisis has been 
exaggerated  1.03   0.79  0 2 
officials public officials don't care  1.27   0.80  0 2 
Male Male gender  0.48   0.50  0 1 
White White ethnicity 0.96 0.19 0 1 
Mixed Mixed ethnicity  0.01   0.09  0 1 
Asian Asian ethnicity  0.02   0.13  0 1 
Black Black ethnicity  0.00   0.07  0 1 
Other “Other” ethnicity  0.00   0.04  0 1 
Age Age   50.25   17.27  20 100 
Age Squared Age squared  2,821   1,808  400 10000 
Sampled before 
referendum 
Sampling occurred before the 
referendum vote (23rd June 2016)  0.42   0.49  0 1 
Employed  Employed at time of 2016 interview 0.62 0.49 0 1 
Unemployed Unemployed at time of 2016 interview  0.03   0.17  0 1 
Inactive Inactive at time of 2016 interview  0.06   0.24  0 1 
Retired Retired at time of 2016 interview  0.26   0.44  0 1 
Student Student at time of 2016 interview  0.01   0.12  0 1 
No qualifications Highest qualification: No qualification 0.27 0.44   
GCSE  Highest qualification: GCSE or equivalent  0.27   0.44  0 1 
A Level Highest qualification: A-level  0.11   0.32  0 1 
Degree 
Highest qualification: Degree or 
equivalent  0.37   0.48  0 1 
Income satisfaction Self-reported satisfaction with income  4.92   1.57  1 7 
Life satisfaction Self-reported satisfaction with life  5.27   1.41  1 7 
Note: 6,221 Observations. Source for all reported variables is Understanding Society, various waves. 
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Table 3. Impact of immobility on Brexit support, probit regression results  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Dependent variable:  
Believes UK should leave the European Union 
Lives in county of birth 0.279*** 0.236*** 0.324*** 
 (0.0367) (0.0387) (0.0536) 
Sample Full Full Only those who 
voted in 2016 
Controls No Yes Yes 
Observations 6,221 6,221 3,457 
Note: Estimated as probit regression results with robust standard errors. Weights applied. Controls used in 
columns 2 and 3: Gender, 5 Ethnic Categories, Age, Age2, whether sampled before Brexit, labour force status 
(employed, retired, student, unemployed, inactive), education, life satisfaction, income satisfaction and 
Government Office Region. Note that regression coefficients without restricting sample to those used in all 
regressions are very similar: for column 1, beta=0.231026, (n = 10,014), for column 3, beta = 0.2284 (n = 7,290) 
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Table 4. Immobility and Brexit support – alternative explanations, 2016 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Area Variable 
 
Dependent variable:  
Believes UK should leave the European Union  
 
           
Immobility Lives in county of birth 0.244*** 0.260*** 0.216*** 0.207*** 
  (0.0408) (0.0407) (0.0411) (0.0417) 
Cognitive test Verbal ability -0.00830**   -0.00437 
  (0.00324)   (0.00333) 
 Numeric ability -0.0928***   -0.0701*** 
  (0.0220)   (0.0228) 
Psychology 
Agreeableness  -0.0823***  -0.0679*** 
   (0.0205)  (0.0210) 
 Conscientiousness  0.0521***  0.0437** 
   (0.0199)  (0.0205) 
 Extraversion  0.0329**  0.0222 
   (0.0155)  (0.0158) 
 Neuroticism  -0.0126  -0.0123 
   (0.0147)  (0.0152) 
 Openness  -0.0837***  -0.0573*** 
   (0.0159)  (0.0165) 
Values / beliefs  Husband should earn, wife 
should stay at home   0.164*** 0.152*** 
    (0.0405) (0.0407) 
 Don't have a say in what 
government does   0.140*** 0.127*** 
    (0.0282) (0.0286) 
 Environmental crisis has been 
exaggerated   0.264*** 0.251*** 
    (0.0252) (0.0254) 
 Public officials don't care   0.144*** 0.137*** 
    (0.0304) (0.0305) 
 Constant -0.299 -0.0829 -1.625*** -0.952*** 
  (0.244) (0.286) (0.245) (0.312) 
 Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Observations 6,221 6,221 6,221 6,221 
 Pseudo R2 0.0881 0.0912 0.123 0.130 
Estimated as a probit regression with robust standard errors. Unreported controls are for gender, age, age2, 
ethnicity, if interviewed before Referendum, education, labour force status and region. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Marginal effect for “Lives in county of birth” is 0.07 in column 4. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
  
III Working paper 19                                        Neil Lee, Katy Morris, Tom Kemeny 
 
35 
 
Table 5. Probit regressions between local change interacted with mobility and 
Brexit support 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
 
Dependent variable:  
Believes UK should leave the European Union  
 
          
Log local gross weekly full time pay, 2015 0.315*** 0.320***   
 (0.0661) (0.0660)   
Immobile: Lives in county of birth 0.199*** 0.387*** 0.175*** 0.0514 
 (0.0415) (0.0939) (0.0411) (0.0713) 
Percent Δ in gross weekly full time pay, 2008 – 2015 -0.00951** -0.00281   
 (0.00373) (0.00475)   
Immobile * Percent Δ in local gross weekly full time pay, 2008 
- 2015  -0.0137**   
  (0.00596)   
Percent Not White British   -0.000399 -0.000496 
   (0.00321) (0.00323) 
Percentage Point Δ Not White-British, 2005 - 2015   0.0194* 0.00557 
   (0.0111) (0.0130) 
Immobile * Percentage Point Δ Not White-British, 2005 - 2015    0.0237** 
    (0.0120) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,684 5,684 5,684 5,684 
Estimated as probit regressions with robust standard errors. Excludes Northern Ireland. Unreported controls are 
for gender, age, age2, ethnicity, if interviewed before Referendum, education and labour force status.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 6. Sensitivity tests: Alternative indicators of immobility, probit 
regression results  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
 
Dependent variable:  
Believes UK should leave the European Union 
 
Stayer-returner 0.00592 -0.0285    
 (0.0418) (0.0418)    
Best friend < 5 miles away   0.0340*  0.0405 
   (0.0174)  (0.0254) 
Mother < 15 minutes away     0.0680*** 0.0350 
    (0.0229) (0.0240) 
Lives in county of birth 
 0.0840*** 
  
0.106*** 
  (0.0166)   (0.0239) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,221 6,221 6,221 2,945 2,945 
Note: Average marginal effects presented. Estimated as probit regression results with robust standard errors. 
Weights applied. Controls used in columns 2 and 3: Gender, 5 Ethnic Categories, Age, Age2, whether sampled 
before Brexit, labour force status (employed, retired, student, unemployed, inactive), education, life satisfaction, 
income satisfaction and Government Office Region.  
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Appendix A: Variable construction 
The main independent variable employed in the analysis presented here describes 
whether a respondent was living in the same county in which they were born at the 
most recent interview. Deriving this binary stayer variable naturally relies on identifying 
where Understanding Society respondents were born, where they were living most 
recently and whether these two locations are the same or different.  
 
Data on the county of birth of Understanding Society respondents is drawn from two 
different sources, reflecting the incorporation of British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS) into Understanding Society from 2010 onwards and the use of different 
geographies and coding systems for recording the county of birth of old BHPS sample 
members and new Understanding Society sample members.  
 
For BHPS respondents county of birth is reported in plbornd - district of birth4. The 
coding framework for plbornd includes some very antiquated geographies (for 
example Middlesex in England; Ogwr in Wales; Cunninghame in Scotland) which are 
matched to the contemporary boundaries of counties or unitary authorities via a look-
up table created specifically for this analysis, which draws on Wikipedia and other 
sources of information about historic local government boundary changes.   
 
For Understanding Society respondents, county of birth is reported in plbornc – county 
of birth. The coding framework for plbornc is entirely different to the coding framework 
for the BHPS plbornd variable but it too includes antiquated geographies (for example 
Avon in England; Cardiganshire in Wales; Kirkcudbrightshire in Scotland). The places 
of birth as reported by Understanding Society respondents are matched to 
contemporary local government boundaries via a separate look-up table created for 
this analysis, which again draws on Wikipedia and other sources of information about 
local government boundary change following a similar protocol to the BHPS matching 
process. In general, plbornc geographies in Understanding Society data are greater 
in scale than BHPS plbornd geographies so BHPS geographies are aggregated up to 
the lowest common denominator offered by the Understanding Society coding 
framework.  
 
Respondents’ current place of residence is identified by locating individuals in 
households and households in contemporary local authority area (pre-2015 local 
government boundaries) using Understanding Society SN 6666 geocodes. Geocodes 
are provided for local authority districts / unitary authorities. Since local authority 
districts represent a lower tier of governance than local authority counties, data on 
local authority district of residence in Wave 8 (or Wave 7, where such data are missing) 
                                                                 
4 BHPS respondents w ho agreed to continue participating in Understanding Society, the successor to the BHPS, have not been 
re-interview ed about w here they w ere born.  
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are aggregated up to local authority county of residence via publically available look-
up tables.  
 
Generating the stayer variable involves comparing whether respondents are still living 
in the same county in which they were born. This is not as straightforward as it may 
sound, for a number of reasons. For example, from the documentation available it is 
not possible to ascertain whether respondents identified the exact place in which they 
were born (most commonly, a place containing a large hospital with a maternity ward) 
or whether they tended to name the place in which their parents were living at the time 
of their birth. It is also impossible to determine exactly what geography respondents 
who said they were born in historic counties such as Lincolnshire were referring to, 
since the old county of Lincolnshire has been split into three contemporary unitary 
authorities: Lincolnshire; North Lincolnshire and North East Lincolnshire.  
 
To mitigate the impact of such geographical quirks, we take a comparatively 
‘generous’ approach to geographical matching. To illustrate, a respondent who was 
born in Lincolnshire is coded as a stayer if they were living in either Lincolnshire; North 
Lincolnshire or North East Lincolnshire unitary authorities in the last wave of 
Understanding Society. They are coded as a leaver if they now live in any other unitary 
authority in the United Kingdom.  
 
